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This Brief is filed by Bodell Construction Company in reply 
to the Brief filed by Steven M. Snelson. The appellees McOmber 
have not filed any responsive brief. 
Bodell seeks in this appeal the reversal of the trial 
court's summary judgment and the entry of a judgment in its 
favor, together with a remand of the case for the purpose of 
establishing the amount of the deficiency due Bodell. In the 
alternative, Bodell seeks a determination that the summary 
judgment in favor of Snelson and McOmber was incorrect. 
REPLY TO SNELSON# S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bodell submits that the following statements from Snelson' s 
"Statement of Facts, " beginning at page 2 of its Memorandum are 
not supported by the record or are otherwise incomplete: 
I. Factual Overview. 
Snelson's "factual overview" is made in large part without 
reference to the record, is actually legal argument, and should 
not be considered: 
a. In the first paragraph, p. 2, Snelson 
states that Bodell grounds his argument on 
the confusion that arose among him and his 
agents concerning the price to be bid at the 
sale. No reference is made to the record in 
support of this statement. In fact, Bodell 
was never asked by anyone to give a price to 
be bid at the sale. (R. 501) 
b. Snelson' s claim that plaintiff ratified 
the sale after full knowledge of the facts is 
a conclusion, and not a statement of fact. 
c. Snelson states (p. 3) that "at the 
trustee's sale, Associated Title bid the full 
amount then owed on behalf of Bodell 
Construction." This statement is made 
without reference to the record. In fact, 
the amount bid by Associated Title exceeded 
the amount due Bodell under the trust deed 
and included a broker' s fee which had been 
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included in the loan payoff amount by Roger 
Terry. (R. 589, p. 88. ) 
d. Snelson argues that after Bodell was 
unsuccessful in attempting to sell the 
property he spoke to his lawyer who made 
suggestions to him regarding what should be 
done. The references to the deposition of 
Michael Bodell do not support the statements 
made. For example, Bodell testified that he 
consulted with the attorney as a result of 
not understanding what process was involved 
in collecting the balance due him. (R. 589, 
p. 81. ) 
e. At the outset of Snelson' s statement of 
"undisputed material facts before the trial 
court, " Snelson quotes a portion of Bodell' s 
counsel' s argument to the trial court. R. 
5 90 at 6. The next paragraph after the one 
quoted states as follows: 
"But I [Bodell's counsel] think at 
a minimum, that the way the record 
exists now -- especially with the 
affidavit of Mr. Newman and the 
depositions that have been taken--
that at a minimum conflicting 
inferences can be drawn from the 
facts which existed in such a 
manner that summary judgment is not 
available. And as long as some 
other conclusion can be drawn, 
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is not 
appropriate." 
II. Undisputed Material Facts. 
With respect to the numbered statements contained in 
Snelson' s Statement of Facts, the following observations are 
made. The numbers of the following paragraphs correspond with 
those set forth by Snelson: 
1. Terry was originally contacted by representatives 
of Snelson and McOmber to see if he could arrange the loan. 
(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 14. ) Terry was paid a fee 
by Snelson and McOmber to secure the loan. (Exhibit 6, 
McOmber deposition, R. 287. ) None of the prior Bodell 
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mortgages had gone to a foreclosure sale. (Bodell7 s 
deposition, R. 288, p. 13 and 14. ) Roger Terry testified 
that he would be very surprised if Bodell took the position 
that Terry was handling the foreclosure for him. "I wasn't 
handling anything for him. The only thing that I did for 
him was to start the foreclosure. " (Terry deposition, R. 
587, p. 126. ) 
4. The January, 1984 letter was drafted at Terry; s 
request. Bodell testified that he didn' t know that the 
title company might rely on the letter, although he assumed 
so. (Bodell deposition, R. 589, at 26. ) In Terry' s April 
12, 1986 letter to Associated Title (R. 587, Exhibit 9), 
Terry enclosed the January 9 letter stating: "As per our 
telephone conversation enclosed is the following documents 
or copies of documents to authorize you to start a 
FORECLOSURE ACTION IMMD. » (Underlining added.) In fact, 
Blake Heiner of Associated Title testified that he did not 
rely upon the January 9 letter as giving him authority to 
determine the bid and that he would not have relied on the 
letter. (Heiner deposition, R. 588, p. 22, 1. 1-4, 6-9. ) 
8. Bodell testified that he never gave Mr. Terry any 
instructions or authority to bid on his behalf at the sale 
and that he never gave anyone else any authority or 
instructions to bid on his behalf at the sale. "I was never 
asked about bid amounts at the sale." Bodell never gave 
Roger Terry any authority or instructions with regard to 
bidding. Bodell testified that he had a phone call from Mr. 
McOmber' s attorney, and a phone call from McOmber and one 
3 
from Mrs. McOmber. There was no evidence, however, that the 
conversations with McOmbers had to do with the pending sale. 
There is no evidence that Snelson or McOmber ever discussed 
with Bodell, Associated or Terry at any time the amount bid 
or to be bid at the sale. The fact that Bodell, and not 
Associated Title, was speaking with McOmber as opposed to 
Associated Title speaking with McOmber, cuts strongly 
against Snelson' s argument that there was apparent 
authority. (Bodell deposition, R. 589 at 45, 46, 53, 
McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 23. ) 
9. The message left by Terry with Associated Title 
stated in full that "payoff on sale tomorrow. ($243, 117. 15 
plus foreclosure costs. )" (R. 303. ) 
Bodell did not assert that Associated should have bid 
the fair market value of the property. Bodell's testimony 
was as follows (Bodell deposition, R. 589 at 63. ): 
Q. Okay. If they hadn't been told anything, then 
what should they have bid? 
A. They should have got on the phone or otherwise 
find out what to bid is my feeling. To me that' s also 
common sense. 
10. Associated did not make an authorized bid on 
behalf of Bodell or purchase the property for Bodell at the 
sale. This statement by Snelson is a conclusion of law. 
11. While the recitations in the trustee' s deed might 
conform with Utah statute, there is nothing in the trustee' s 
deed to confirm or support the proposition that the bid made 
by Associated Title was a bid made with proper authority. 
(Trustee' s Deed is at R. 589, Exh. 14. ) 
13. After the first sale, Bodell spoke with McOmber 
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and told McOmber that in his opinion, the sale wasn' t even a 
sale and that it remained McOmber' s home. During this same 
time, McOmber indicated that he was still trying to sell the 
home and make good. (Bodell deposition, R. 288, at 93, 
96. ) McOmber continued to reside in the home after the 
first sale. (McOmber deposition, R. 287, P. 22, 23. ) The 
listing agreement that Bodell signed contained exceptions 
for the benefit of McOmber. (R. 587, Exhibit 18. ) On 
October 4, 1984, McOmber relisted the home for sale in his 
own name and continued to reside in the home and attempt to 
sell the home until after the second sale. (Bodell depo, R. 
589, 93, Exhibit 18. ) 
14. Pursuant to the trust deed, Bodell was entitled to 
collect rents upon default regardless of whether a 
foreclosure had occurred. (Trust Deed, R. 202.) 
15. If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 
1984 and offered to purchase the property for $239,000.00 in 
cash, Bodell would have been obligated to sell the property 
to mitigate McOmber' s liability and Bodell' s damages. 
17. Rappaport' s statement at the meeting with Bodell 
and Terry that the trustee did not have authority to bid was 
a statement of fact and not legal advice. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision in this matter was made by summary judgment. 
Bodell has never been given an opportunity to present evidence at 
a trial. Snelson does not disagree with the standard of review 
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to be applied. The trial court' s decision can be reviewed by 
this court for correctness. Gillman v. Dept. of Financial 
Institutions. 782 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1989). This court should 
construe the facts presented in the summary judgment proceedings 
in the light most favorable to Bodell. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
v. State. 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 1989). In addition, and most 
significantly in this action, the undisputed facts must be such 
that conflicting inferences cannot be drawn from them. Sandberg 
v. Klein. 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978). In this case, where the 
standards of practice of foreclosing trustees are at issue, 
summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standards 
are fixed as a matter of law. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 
780 P. 2d 821 (Utah App. 1989). 
The evidence in a summary judgment proceeding must be such 
as to preclude any reasonable probability that Bodell could win 
if given a trial in this matter. Judkins v. Toone, 492 P. 2d 980 
(Utah 1978); Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center. Inc. , 354 
P. 2d 559 (Utah 1960). 
II 
ASSOCIATED TITLE HAD NO ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO 
ENTER A BID ON BEHALF OF BODELL. 
As set forth in Bodell' s opening brief, actual authority may 
be either express or implied. 2A C. J. S. Agency. §146. Snelson 
does not attempt to argue that express authority was given. It 
is undisputed that Bodell never gave anyone express authority to 
bid on his behalf. No one ever asked him. (Bodell deposition, 
R. 589, p. 53, and R. 501. ) 
In support of its argument that actual authority existed, 
Snelson relies entirely upon the principal of implied authority, 
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and more specifically, the January 9, 1984 letter. In doing so, 
Snelson ignores the proposition set forth in the case of Bullfrog 
Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d 266 (Utah 1972), that the 
interpretation of the letter by the parties to it, (Bodell, 
Landmark and Associated) should be not only persuasive but 
determinative. The undisputed testimony was that neither Terry 
nor Associated relied upon the letter as creating actual 
authority to bid at the sale. (Heiner deposition, R. 588, p. 22; 
Affidavit of Blake Heiner, R. 211; Terry deposition, R. 587, p. 
35; Terry Affidavit, R. 214. ) 
Instead, Snelson argues that 
It is not credible that the letter granting 
11
 full and complete authority11 was meant to 
limit that grant to only the beginning of the 
foreclosure proceedings, (p. 12 of Brief.) 
Credibility is not a factor to be determined at the summary 
judgment level. Sandberg, supra. Credibility is for a trier of 
fact. If reasonable people can vary in their interpretation of 
the letter, summary judgment is not appropriate on the issue of 
implied authority. Judkins, supra. 
Snelson argues next that Bodell relied on Terry and Heiner 
throughout the foreclosure proceedings, and implies that as a 
result he was bound by their conduct. (Appellee' s Brief, p. 12. ) 
To the contrary, Roger Terry testified that he would be very 
surprised if Bodell took the position that Terry was handling the 
foreclosure for him. Terry testified that "I wasn't handling 
anything for him. The only thing that I did for him was to start 
the foreclosure. " (Terry deposition, R. 587, p. 126. ) Heiner 
and Bodell never even spoke. 
Snelson fails to address the Restatement of Agency 2d, §34, 
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which states in part that 
An authorization is interpreted in light of 
all accompanying circumstances, including 
among others matters, (a) the situation of 
the parties, their relations to one another, 
and the business in which they are engaged; . 
. . (d) the nature of the subject matter, the 
circumstances under which the act is to be 
performed and the legality or illegality of 
the act; and (e) the formality or 
informality, and the care or lack of it, with 
which an instrument evidencing the authority 
is drawn. 
At page 13 of its Brief, Snelson passes off these issues by 
saying that the defendants never relied on any customer usage in 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. In fact, Bodell did rely upon 
custom of trustees before the district court. (R. 526-535.) The 
only evidence before the trial court on the issue of custom of 
trustees in conducting foreclosure sales was the Affidavit of 
Alfred Newman, a title company officer and trustee in thousands 
of trustee matters (R. 506), which states that 
It is also my opinion that it would not be in 
accordance with usual or customary practices 
of trustees in conducting sales to enter a 
bid on behalf of a beneficiary without 
express authorization to do so. In this 
connection, I have examined a telephone 
message which is Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit 
of Blake Heiner . . . That message, in my 
opinion, is ambiguous and would create in my 
mind an ambiguity as to the intent of the 
beneficiary. . . . It is also my opinion 
that a request by a beneficiary to a trustee 
to foreclose does not carry with it the 
authority for the trustee to bid or purchase 
the property without further instructions. 
As a trustee, I would not consider the 
January 9, 1984 letter as authority to 
determine a bid or to bid at the sale. 
Snelson' s arguments must also be considered in light of the 
situation of both Bodell and Associated. Bodell was not 
experienced in foreclosures. He never understood his simple 
8 
letter of January 9 to grant anyone decision making authority, 
but understood it simply as a request to get the ball rolling. 
(R. 589, p. 26. ) The only evidence before the trial court on the 
scope of authority to be drawn from the letter was i) that no 
authority was understood by Associated or Landmark to have been 
given by the letter to determine to make the bid without further 
instruction (R. 588, p. 22), and ii) that it was not reasonable 
for a trustee in Utah would have acted upon the January 9 letter 
as giving it authority to bid at the sale or purchase of the 
property without further instructions. (R. 507. ) 
Snelson apparently acquiesces in the appellant's 
interpretation and application of the case of Mercantile Trust 
Co. , N. A. v. Harper, 622 S. W. 2d 345 (Mo. App. 1981) regarding the 
limited interpretation given to the phrase to "transact all 
matters of business," including the application of §37 of the 
Restatement of Agency 2d, and also of the Allen v. Steinberg, 223 
A. 2d 240 (Md. 1966) case, which warns against stretching 
authority given to initiate an act into authority to consummate 
an act. 
Snelson argues next in support of implied authority that 
Bodell authorized the purchase of the property at the trustee's 
sale (Appellee's Brief, p. 13) and that there was merely 
confusion about what the purchase price should be. Initially, 
Bodell never knew that any amount, either payoff or bid, had been 
conveyed to the trustee. Associated Title asked for the payoff 
amount and was told a payoff amount. The payoff amount and the 
bid amount are two entirely different matters. Snelson attempts 
to pass off the controversy as one between Associated Title and 
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Bodell. That is not the case. The error had nothing to do with 
Bodell. 
The recipient of the windfall in this matter is Snelson, the 
individual who borrowed $200,000.00 using someone else7 s house as 
collateral, who never made a single payment, never attended the 
trustee' s sale, and who is now attempting to seize upon an error 
made by an independent trustee which was in no way the 
responsibility of Bodell. 
Snelson argues that authority is inferred from the sale 
itself, theorizing that because Bodell had asked Associated to 
foreclose the property that it necessarily gave Associated all of 
the authority needed to complete the foreclosure. This argument 
ignores the process involved, the standards of trustees in the 
community, and the intentions of the parties. In making this 
argument, Snelson ignores the argument set forth by Bodell in its 
opening brief at pages 17 through 23, inclusive, that authority 
to purchase cannot be inferred from the request to foreclose. 
Snelson has not cited a single case that is factually on point 
that supports the proposition that a request to a trustee to 
foreclose carries with it the authority on the part of the 
trustee to determine the bid at the sale and purchase the 
property. The proposition itself is ominous. Does every 
beneficiary who requests a title company to foreclose bind 
himself to whatever bid the title company might make at a sale? 
The Affidavit of Alfred Newman (R. 505) clearly demonstrates that 
this standard does not apply in the state of Utah. 
This case can be analogized to the attorney-client 
relationship. While the attorney has discretion to determine the 
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procedures to be followed it is the client who must expressly 
authorize settlement. State v. Musselman, 667 P. 2d 1061 at 1067 
(Utah 1983). Bodell never authorized the "settlement." 
Bodell has previously cited a series of cases, including 
Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. , 402 
F. Supp. 421, subsequent decision at 460 F. Supp. 163 (E. D. Pa. 
1975); Cruikshank v. Home, 386 N. W. 2d 134 (Iowa App. 1986), S. B. 
v. Eeles, 207 N. E. 2d 918 (Mass. 1965), all of which discuss 
limitations of authority which are relevant to and bear upon the 
issues before this court. Snelson has ignored these concepts. 
Snelson has also ignored the article at 59 C.J. S. Mortgages, 
§578(b), which concludes that there is no implied authority in 
trustees to bid. 
Snelson has failed to address the proposition advanced in 2A 
C. J. S. , Agency §154 that "there can be no implication of 
authority where the subject is covered by express authority, and 
a distinct and independent power cannot be made to spring from 
the grant of another power. " Here, the grant was to begin 
foreclosure. By statute, a trustee in Utah is the only person 
authorized to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The 
authority granted by the statute is to sell. The trustee' s 
authority to bid for the beneficiary cannot spring from the mere 
request that the trustee perform its statutory duty to sell the 
property. 
Finally, Snelson relies upon the case of 0. S. Stapley Co. v. 
Logan, 431 P. 2d 910, 913 (Ariz. A. 1967) in support of its 
argument regarding implied authority. In Stapley, the agent was 
an office manager who, through a long course of conduct, had been 
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cloaked with apparent authority to manage the office and enter 
into contracts on behalf of the principal. The Stardev case is 
readily distinguishable from the facts involved here m that 
Bodell and Associated had had no prior course of dealing, and 
certainly none of which Snelson or McOmber were aware. The 
sentence from the case quoted by Snelson was preceded by the 
following: 
One of the established rules of agency law is 
that a principal is not liable on contracts 
which he has in no way authorized. 
Bodell did not authorize the purchase of the property at the 
sale by Associated at any price. There was no actual authority, 
either express or implied, to bid in at the sale. 
Ill 
ASSOCIATED TITLE DID NOT HAVE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO 
PURCHASE THE PROPERTY. 
Snelson agrees that the three elements necessary to find 
apparent authority are as follows: 
a. Acts or conduct of the principal (Bodell); 
b. Reliance on those acts by a third person (here, 
McOmber or Snelson); and 
c. A resulting change in position by the third 
person. 2A C. J. S. Agency §157 (Appellee's Brief, p. 18.) 
The doctrine of apparent authority of an agent to bind his 
principal has no application to transactions involving the sale 
or conveyance of land. Buah v. Word, 424 S. W. 2d 274, 279 (Tex. 
1968). 
This issue is factually driven. Some of the statements made 
by Snelson in support of his argument, are not supported by the 
record. For example, at page 18 (of the 31 page brief), 
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regarding communications between Bodell and McOmber prior to the 
sale, Snelson suggests that there was frequent communication and 
that there were conversations about matters incident to the 
trustee's sale. No reference is made to the record in connection 
with the statements. In fact, there was probably only one 
conversation between Bodell and McOmber prior to the sale. 
(McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 25. ) There is nothing to 
support any contention that Bodell and McOmber discussed 
Associated Title or the extent of any authority that Associated 
might have at the sale. Apparent authority must arise from 
conduct of the principal. Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of 
President of Church, etc. . 534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975). The fact 
that Bodell was calling, and not Associated, cuts strongly 
against any apparent authority. There is no evidence that 
McOmber had any contact with Associated. 
Snelson argues that McOmber "obviously relied on the 
authority of Associated Title by performing acts that indicated 
title had been divested from him . . . . " (p. 18) This statement 
misses the point. The reliance must be on Bodell' s acts not on 
Associated' s. Not a single act of Bodell is pointed to as having 
been relied upon by McOmber in support of Associated' s authority. 
Finally, Snelson argues that McOmber "obviously changed his 
position . . . . " The act pointed to, "the divest[ing] of 
title," was not an act of McOmber. Furthermore, it is impossible 
to imagine how McOmber "relied" on the trustee's deed where he 
remained in the property, as he had before the sale, and 
continued to try to market the property. Snelson argues that the 
transfer of a single rent check constitutes a change in position. 
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In fact, as discussed in Bodell' s opening brief, Bodell was 
entitled to receive the rent because of the default, whether or 
not a foreclosure had occurred. 
None of the events relied on by Snelson occurred prior to 
the sale. At the time of the August sale, McOmber had no basis 
to believe that apparent authority existed, 
Snelson relies upon the case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Jones, 672 P. 2d 73 (Utah 1983). That action was one to recover 
for credit card charges made to the defendant' s accounts by their 
spouses. The court determined that the defendants asked the bank 
to issue credit cards to their spouses on their accounts. 
Apparent authority was undeniable. But the case has no factual 
or legal relevance, by analogy or otherwise, to the case at hand. 
McOmber was not aware only that Associated was a trustee. 
Snelson' s argument may have been more persuasive if he had 
attended the sale and withheld a bid based upon Associated 
Title's conduct. McOmber and Snelson did not attend the sale. 
Snelson relies next upon the Restatement (2d) of Agency, 
§49. In particular, Snelson relies upon an incomplete recitation 
of Comment b to §49, having omitted one crucial element, 
underlined as follows: 
B. Authority and Apparent Authority 
Compared. . . . [T]here may be apparent 
authority created by the principal's 
acquiescence in the agent' s conduct when this 
is known to the third person. Likewise, if 
the principal manifests to the third person 
that the agent is authorized to conduct a 
transaction, there is apparent authority in 
the agent to conduct it in accordance with 
the ordinary usages of the business and to do 
the incidental things which ordinarily 
accompany the performance of such 
transaction, unless the third person has 
notice that the agent's authority is 
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limited. 
The only evidence before the court with respect to the "ordinary 
usages of the business" is Newman' s testimony that Associated 
would not have authority to determine or enter a bid without 
express instructions from Bodell. (R. 507. ) 
Snelson relies next upon Illustration 2 to Comment bj In 
fact, Illustration 3 is more applicable to the case at hand. 
The conclusion of Illustration 3 is that where the relationship 
between the principal and agent is not known by the prior 
experience of the third party, that no apparent authority 
arises. There was no course of conduct between Bodell and 
Associated out of which apparent authority could arise for 
Snelson to have been aware of. Illustration 2 is further 
distinguishable upon its premise that the interest rate was not 
unreasonable. In this case, there is a question of fact as to 
whether a bid of $243,000.00, an amount actually in excess of 
what was due, was reasonable where the value of the home was only 
$170, 000. 00. 
Snelson relies next upon Comment c to §49 of the Restatement 
of Agency 2d regarding inferences drawn from an agent' s position. 
This comment relies upon the ordinary habits of persons, in this 
case trustees, and the locality, trade or profession. The only 
evidence on this issue was the Newman Affidavit stating that it 
is not the ordinary habit of trustees in foreclosures to 
determine and enter bids at the sale without express direction 
from the principal. 
There was no apparent authority. The basic elements of 
apparent authority do not exist. At a minimum, there are facts 
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from which conflicting inferences may be drawn so as to make 
summary judgment on this issue in favor of Snelson incorrect. 
IV 
BODELL DID NOT RATIFY THE AUGUST TRUSTEE' S SALE. 
In order for ratification to occur, the following elements 
must be satisfied: i) There must be the principal's knowledge 
of material facts, and ii) an intent by the principal to ratify. 
And if the law requires the authority to have been given in 
writing in the first instance, the ratification itself must also 
be in writing. Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982); 3 
Am. Jur. 2d Agency §185 e£ seq. See also Williams v. Singleton, 
723 P. 2d 421 (Utah 1986). Snelson does not contend that written 
ratification occurred. 
The purpose of ratification, as applied to the agency 
relationship, is to prevent unjust enrichment to the principal 
and to assure that no loss accrues to innocent third parties. 
Old Security Life Insurance Co. v. Continental Illinois National 
Bank & Trust, 740 F. 2d 1384 (Ca. 7 1984). Snelson does not 
contend that there was any unjust enrichment to Bodell. 
This court can determine, as a matter of law, that because 
there was no written ratification and no unjust enrichment, there 
is no ratification. 
At a minimum, because ratification is a matter of intention, 
and cannot be inferred from acts which might be explained without 
any intent to ratify, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency §187, there is an issue 
of fact when all of the events are considered in the light most 
favorable to Bodell. Ratification and its existence is itself a 
question of fact. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel & Waiver §31. 
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None of the cases cited by Snelson are factually similar to 
this one. For example, in Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 
P. 2d 571 (Utah 1951), the principal delivered a substantial 
portion of a meat order before the principal ever claimed that 
its agent was not authorized to accept the order. In Doxey 
Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 479 P. 2d 348 (Utah 1971), the principals 
signed four extensions of a note before asserting that the note 
was not authorized in the first instance. In Lowe v. April 
Industries, Inc. , 531 P. 2d 1297 (Utah 1974), stock had been 
printed pursuant to an agreement over a three year period before 
the principal asserted that the agreement was not authorized. 
In this case, a trier of fact could readily conclude that 
Bodell did not have knowledge of all material facts surrounding 
the transaction until he received a copy of the trustee' s deed 
near the beginning of October, at which point in time he 
immediately engaged in a course of conduct which is directly 
contrary to ratification. As soon as the facts were brought home 
to Bodell, he advised McOmber that an error had been made and 
McOmber concurred. Bodell contacted Associated Title who agreed 
to reconduct the sale. McOmber executed a new listing agreement. 
Until such time as Bodell had full knowledge of the material 
facts, ratification, by definition, could not occur. This lack 
of knowledge is the key factor distinguishing this case from the 
cases cited by Snelson, including for example, Navrides v. 
Zurich Insurance Co. . 488 P. 2d 637 (Cal. 1971), a client sued the 
insurance carrier to collect on a check issued by the carrier the 
proceeds of which were taken by the attorney, contending that its 
attorney was not authorized to enter into a settlement agreement 
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on its behalf. In the Navrides case, the client was fully aware 
of the settlement and its terms when it sought to collect the 
funds which had been lost by the forgery. The court concluded 
that by seeking recovery of the check proceeds the client 
ratified the unauthorized settlement. 
The case of Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc. , 104 P. 2d 619 (Utah 
1940) does not address the issue at hand. The Utah Supreme Court 
observed that the "facts limit us strictly to a question of 
whether or not knowledge of an agent acquired in an effort to 
carry out a void agreement can be attributed to the principal. " 
The decision does not address the issue of ratification. 
The thrust of Snelson' s argument was that Bodell had gone so 
far that ratification could not be withdrawn. None of the cases 
cited by Snelson in support of this proposition even found 
ratification. For example, in Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74 
(Utah 1982) the court found that there could be no ratification 
of the sale of property as a matter of law where the ratification 
was required to be in writing because of the statute of frauds. 
649 P. 2d at 79. In Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co. , 17 P. 2d 256 
(Utah 1932), the court concluded that "we cannot yield assent in 
carrying the doctrine of ratification to such an extent and 
beyond the purpose and legal principal upon which it is founded. •' 
In Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477, 24 L.Ed. 276 (1877), a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision cited in Bradshaw, supra. , the facts went 
far beyond those which exist in this matter. In Stark, the party 
against whom ratification was asserted had sold property in what 
is now the City of Portland years prior to the dispute. He had 
subsequently entered into transactions to buttress his title to 
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the proper-cy wnicn naa aireaay seen soia ana m e n sougnr ro 
repudiate the prior sale based upon federal statutes which 
became effective subsequently when Oregon became a state. The 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "upon every principal of law 
and morals, you should be forever enjoined from the commission of 
such an injustice." The case did not involve agency issues. 
Snelson concludes that "there can be no doubt that Bodell 
ratified the trustee's purchase of the property with full 
knowledge of the pertinent facts. " And yet, when all of the 
facts are considered in the light most favorable to Bodell, 
reasonable minds could readily differ as to i) whether Bodell had 
full knowledge; and ii) whether Bodell had the requisite level of 
intent, each of which are crucial elements of ratification. 
Interestingly enough, Judge Daniels of the Third District 
Court in a companion case concluded that reasonable minds could 
differ on the issue. A copy of that Order is attached to 
Bodell7 s opening brief. 
Finally, Snelson argues in a circuitous manner the existence 
of the authority to Associated Title for the purchase of the 
property and that U. C. A. §57-1-27(1), U. C. A. , creates authority 
in the trustee to bid. (Snelson Brief, p. 26. ) This is, in 
essence, the argument advanced and discussed earlier (p. 10) that 
the mere request to foreclose does not carry with it the 
authority for the trustee to purchase and determine the purchase 
price. The statute creates no authority to bid. It merely 
permits the trustee to enter bids. There was no written 
authority ever given by Bodell to anyone to enter a bid on his 
behalf to acquire the property, and certainly no instructions 
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with respect to what the purchase price, if any, was to be. 
Bodell most certainly contends that authority to purchase and to 
bid any price at the sale must be in writing. Without specific 
written authority to purchase, the trustee violated the statute 
of frauds. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982). 
V 
THE NOVEMBER SALE IS NOT BARRED BY 
ANY " UNILATERAL MISTAKE." 
It cannot be said that Bodell made any mistake regarding the 
bid at the sale. Bodell never knew that any amount had to be bid 
at the sale. Bodell was never contacted or requested to provide 
information regarding a bid by either Landmark or Associated. 
Bodell did not know that Associated had been given any reason to 
believe that it had authority to bid or had been given an amount 
to bid. 
These and other facts set this case apart from each of the 
cases relied upon by Snelson in its argument that this trustee' s 
sale cannot be set aside. In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings v. 
Mehr, 791 P. 2d 217 (Utah App. 1990) the trustee was also the 
beneficiary. There was no issue regarding the authority of the 
person entering the bid at the sale. This court found that "at 
all times Occidental had full knowledge of all relevant facts. " 
(p. 220) In fact, the suit to collect the deficiency had 
commenced prior to the time that the sale was reconducted. The 
Mehr decision was based upon principals of estoppel. 
The Jones v. Johnson decision, 761 P. 2d 37 (Utah App. 1988) 
did not involve a trustee' s sale. In Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc. , 743 P. 2d 1158 (Utah 1987) the 
beneficiary failed to commence a deficiency proceeding in time 
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and then sought to reconduct the sale based upon a bad date in 
the notice. The court concluded that if the second sale is based 
upon defects in notice, the defect must have chilled bidding. 
This action does not involve any contention that there were 
defects in the notice. A much more basic issue exists. There 
was no buyer at the sale. 
In Bank of Myrtle Point v. Security Bank of Coos County, 718 
P. 2d 1373 (Ore. App. 1986) the bidder at the sale had written 
authority from the beneficiary of the amount to bid. (fn. 1, p. 
1377) In that decision, the beneficiary appears to have also 
been the trustee. In Flaherty v. Davenport, 199 N. W. 904 (Minn. 
1924), the Minnesota Supreme Court found that there was no 
question that the attorney who conducted the sale had authority 
to bid. The only question raised on appeal was whether the 
attorney had authority to bid a specific amount. In this case, 
Associated Title had no authority to enter a bid, let alone 
determine an amount. 
Finally, Snelson argues that the "plaintiff fails to 
indicate how the reconveyance of the property from the 
beneficiary to the trustee through the quit claim deed would 
reinstate the interest of the trustors. In fact, the quit claim 
deed was not necessary. Mistake of fact is a recognized ground 
for the cancellation of deeds, 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Cancellation of 
Instruments §31 e£ seq. : 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds §213 e£ seq. There 
having been no buyer at the trustee' s sale, there was no sale and 
the trustee' s deed was void abinitio. 
Cancellation of trustee' s deeds has been permitted in 
circumstances where a mistake has been made by the trustee or 
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others in conducting or perfecting a foreclosure. In Peterson v. 
First National Bank, 203 N. W. 53, 42 ALR 1185 (Minn. 1925), the 
beneficiary' s attorney erred in the manner he conducted the 
foreclosure proceedings and bid the sum of $835. 00 on his 
client's claim of $15,000.00. As a result of Minnesota case law 
which the attorney overlooked, his conduct resulted in the 
beneficiary' s loss of its interest in the property leaving the 
beneficiary with only the right to seek a deficiency for the 
difference. Subsequent to the foreclosure proceeding, the 
trustors continued to treat the property as their own and 
ultimately sold it by trading their perceived equity to third 
parties. The court, finding the blame solely on the plaintiff 
and his attorney, nevertheless cancelled the foreclosure, relying 
principally upon the fact that by doing so the parties had not 
changed their position and they could each be restored to their 
original position without detriment. This case has unique 
application to the present litigation. McOmbers continued to 
reside in the property and to treat it as their own, continuing 
their efforts to sell the property. Both Bodell and McOmber were 
effectively restored to their position without detriment prior to 
the second sale. 
Cancellation was also allowed in Geria v. Loveland, 62 Pac. 
830 (Cal. 1900) where the beneficiary owned two mortgages against 
the debtor' s property. The beneficiary initiated foreclosure on 
his first mortgage first, thereby inadvertently cutting off his 
own second mortgage. The court permitted the beneficiary to 
unwind the transaction and complete the foreclosures in a logical 
sequence. The court' s primary consideration in permitting such 
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relief was the fact that neither party had been damaged as a 
result. Even the Utah courts have recognized that foreclosures 
are not absolute upon their completion. In Mickelson v. 
Anderson. 81 Utah 444, 19 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1933), the beneficiary 
failed to include the then present owner of the property in his 
judicial foreclosure because of an error in the abstract which he 
obtained prior to commencing the foreclosure. The beneficiary 
concluded the judicial foreclosure and then upon realizing his 
error sought to extend his rights to the omitted owner by a 
second action. The Utah Supreme Court recognized that the error 
which had been made was one of fact and that the beneficiary was 
entitled to go back and conduct a proper foreclosure with respect 
to the property. The recent decision in Guardian State Banx v. 
Stana3_; 778 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1989) recognizes the authority of a 
court to correct an error even when the error is unilateral. 
In the circumstances of this case, where the McOmbers 
continued to reside in the property an<i to market the property up 
to and including the time of the second foreclosure sale, there 
is no reason to believe that they woulcl be damaged by recognizing 
the second sale. At issue here is whether a trustee' s sale is 
avoidable under any circumstance or whether it is absolutely 
final. The first trustee' s sale in this action is void for all 
of thfe reasons discussed herein. 
VT 
THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST BODELL. 
It remains Bodell's primary contention that it is entitled 
to summary judgment declaring the fiirst sale void purely as a 
matter of law based upon Associated' s lack of authority to 
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purchase at the sale. There was no purchaser at the August sale. 
At a minimum, there are issues of fact which preclude 
summary judgment against Bodell. The issues of fact include the 
following: 
1. With respect to the January 9, 1984 letter, its purpose 
was understood by those involved to get the ball rolling and not 
to confer authority to enter or determine a bid at the sale. 
(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26, 26, 29; Terry deposition, 
12/22/88, p. 34, 36, 126; Heiner deposition, p. 22. ) At a 
minimum, the letter is ambiguous as to its purpose and the extent 
of the authority given. The only other basis for the authority 
of Associated to purchase at the sale was through some sort of 
authority implied from the sale. The only evidence with respect 
to this issue was the testimony of Alfred Newman that the 
industry standards on bidding by trustees require explicit 
authority from the beneficiary. The existence o>f the standards 
create, at a minimum, an issue of fact as to whether implied 
authority existed in Associated Title to enter a bid for Bodell. 
Another issue of fact is created by the telephone message from 
Terry to Heiner which clearly states that it is a payoff and not 
a bid. The trial court is not in a position to determine as a 
matter of law that the word "payoff" should be changed to mean 
"bid amount. " 
2. There was no evidence of any conduct by Bodell that 
created apparent authority in Associated Title. 
3. There was no evidence that Bodell knowingly or 
intentionally ratified the unauthorized bid. When the facts are 
construed in the light most favorable to Bodell, including the 
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events subsequent to the first sale there, is at a minimum, a 
fact issue as to whether Bodell had sufficient knowledge to make 
a knowing, intentional ratification. 
4. This court should consider the decision of the Third 
District Court in the sister case, Civil No. C88-5531, copies of 
which decision were included in Bodell' s opening memorandum. In 
that matter, Judge Daniels concluded that there were issues of 
material fact on each of the issues upon which Judge Ballif 
awarded summary judgment. Reasonable minds have already differed 
as to the result which could be reached on these fact 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
At a minimum, the summary judgment against Bodell should be 
set aside and the matter remanded for trial in the Fourth 
District Court. 
DATED this <?Q day of (Oly^ / 1990. 
KeithLW. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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